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BOOK REVIEWS
The Diplomatic Protection of Americans in Mexico. By Frederick
Sherwood Dunn. New York: Columbia University Press, 1933.
Pp. x, 439. $5.00.
When Josephus Daniels, of North Carolina, accepted the Mexican
mission two years ago, slightly more than a century had passed since
Joel R. Poinsett, of South Carolina, went to Mexico City as our first
Minister. Our turbulent neighbor to the South had in 1825 just thrown
off the yoke of Spain and put on the garb of Republican institutions.1
That century of American-Mexican relations has seen one war and innumerable diplomatic passages arising out of the American State Department's effort to see that American nationals received the minimum
of protection of life and property supposed to be guaranteed by international law. Professor Dunn, drawing mainly on the archives of the
Department, has given an impartial account of the causes of friction
and has carefully analrzed, in the light of the actual facts, the reasons
relied on by both governments. This examination of diplomatic correspondence and the opinions of international claims commissions discloses a striking disparity between practice and theory.
The first four chapters are historical and carry the reader down to
the Dictatorship of Diaz. In the beginning, the American effort to gain
the Mexican trade now first released from Spanish monopoly was hampered by our ambition to acquire Texas. At length, in 1835, Texas,
now predominantly American in character, revolted and declared her
independence. American sympathy with Texas had been and continued
an obvious cause of friction between the two countries. The claims
arbitration convention of 1839,2 intended to wipe out old scores, did settle the claims, but the old suspicion and hostility remained. Payment
of the awards dragged on. Texas was annexed by the United States
in 1845, and shortly afterwards Secretary Buchanan sent Slidell to
Mexico with offers to assume American claims against Mexico and to
pay five, twenty, twenty-five millions of dollars for a boundary that
would include Texas, and California in part, or as a whole. These overtures were rejected, war followed, and the Treaty of Guadelupe Hidalgo8
followed the war. The United States acquired New Mexico and Cal' Poinsett himself left an account of Mexico at this period in his NoTs ox'
MEXICO MADE IN 1822 (1825) ; and a delightful account of a slightly later period
is that by the American wife of the first Spanish Minister, Mme. Calderon de la
Barca, LIFE iN MEXIcO (1843).
2I MALLOY, TRFATEs 1101.
'I MALLOY, TREATIES 1107.
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ifornia for $15,000,000 and agreed to assume all undischarged American
4
claims arising before the 1839 Convention.
But the treaty of '48 did not satisfy American territorial ambitions.
The doctrine of "manifest destiny" had taken on new life in the United
States, which had now become a continental empire. Americans began
to cast about for quicker means of transit to the Pacific than those afforded by trails through the Rockies or by sea around the Horn. Public
attention soon 'became centered on the possibility of a railroad or canal
across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in Mexico. At about the same time,
it may be noted, the character of American complaints against Mexico
changed; for difficulties over customs regulations, wrongful imprisonment and seizures of property began to give way to contract claims. Professor Dunn traces in a full chapter the Isthmian concessions in American hands, Gadsden's mission and his negotiation of the Treaty of
1854 for the purchase of more territory, the vain efforts of the United
States to obtain settlement of increasing claims and to buy still more
territory, and the rise of Juarez to power. The French intervention of
1861 and Maximilian's- brief and tragic reign are summarily disposed of.
A marked change in our attitude followed our Civil War. As American territorial ambitions had arisen chiefly in the slave states of the
South, the resumption of American relations with Mexico in 1867 saw
no further efforts to tie up claims settlements with the acquisition of
more territory from Mexico. A better feeling prevailed and found expression in the Claims Convention of 1868. Within a short interval
after Juarez's death Porfirio Diaz gained control of the government,
just in time to meet the first payments of the awards of the Claims Commission of 1868 which fell due on January 31, 1877. A new era was at
hand. The best commentary on the old is that of our minister, Mr.
Foster, who in urging the recognition of Diaz reminded Mr. Evarts
that in the last fifty years there had been nearly sixty changes of government in Mexico !5
Having established an historical perspective, Professor Dunn now
turns to consider the specific problems of diplomatic protection, and
devotes his next six chapters to forced loans and special taxes, revolutionary damages (the two main questions which retarded American
recognition of Diaz), limitations on protection, denial of justice and
exhaustion of local remedies, and police protection. These chapters constitute half of the book, but can be considered here, unfortunately, only
in a cursory way. The forced loan generally took the form of a tax
laid by a military commander on a particular town or state. While for'Arts. XIV, XV.
'Foster to Evarts, 28 April 1877, MS. Desp. Mex., vol. 59, Dept. of State.
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eigners were not openly discriminated against, their property generally
bore the brunt of such levies. The United States at one time sought to
have certain capital levies comprehended under the category of forced
loans. The Claims Commission of 1868 took contradictory views:
Umpire Lieber thought such loans illegal, Umpire Thornton thought
them legal. The growing stability of the Diaz regime promising a
cessation of the practice, the United States at length abandoned the
issue.
Again, Mexico advanced the doctrine of non-responsibility of states
for the acts of insurgents on the authority of a now celebrated but then
"recent writer," Calvo. The United States did not abandon its contention, but it is significant that Thornton refused to sustain it in his
Claims decisions. During this same period Mexico sought to limit the
recourse of foreigners to the diplomatic protection of their own governments by legislation requiring them to "matriculate" on pain of forfeiting the "rights of foreigners." The real property laws provided
that foreigners acquiring land became thereby Mexicans unless they
should declare their intention at the time to retain their foreign nationality. These laws rested on the theory that an individual citizen might
renounce his right to diplomatic protection although a foreign government's right to intervene on its citizens' behalf could not be abridged:
a distinction which if admitted in theory would have effectively nullified
in practice any diplomatic protection. The Claims Commission's decisions unfortunately showed little appreciation of the questions involved.
At length in 1886 compulsory matriculation was abolished and the land
law was modified by extension of the declaration period.
The author gives a very full chapter to denial of justice and its common prerequisite, exhaustion of local remedies. The abuse went back to
1825 but assumed great importance under the Diaz r6gime. It is unnecessary to discuss here a doctrine so familiar. Stated briefly, it is
said that the claimant's failure to exhaust local remedies bars diplomatic
interposition in his behalf except where the denial of justice is notorious
and is in re minima dubia in the highest court of appeals. Professor
Dunn shows by analysis of the decisions of the Claims Commission of
1868 that the rule contended for by the Mexican Government was applied only when it led to conclusions otherwise thought desirable. Subsequent diplomatic discussions, including the famous Cutting case,0 are
reviewed at length, and the conclusion reached that the long controversy
ended favorably for the Mexican viewpoint. As time went on, however,
the Mexican Government showed an increasing consideration for foreigners and causes of friction decreased. Adequate police protection
' See 2 MooPE, INT. LAw DIGEST (1906) 228.

BOOK REVIEWS

119

against crimes and banditry, however, remained a frequent topic of discussion. Here Professor Dunn rightly distinguishes between "denials
of justice" and the Government's failure to prosecute a criminal. He
treats the latter as a failure of the police system rather than of the
courts. A nice question arises here, whether mere failure to prosecute
the criminal where no lack of due diligence to prevent the crime is
shown, can properly be made the basis for a pecuniary award measured
by the actual loss sustained.
The last quarter of the book is in some ways the most interesting. It
deals with the social revolution and the rise of Mexican nationalism,
with oil, agrarian reform, nationalism and the renunciation of protection,
and with the work of the Claims Commissions of 1923. Unfortunately
these chapters, apparently, had to be written from published sources only
and do not show as clear a picture, therefore, of diplomatic relations as
those which precede. Diaz's thirty-five years of power, which came to
an end in 1910, gave a degree of order and security hitherto unheard of
in Mexico. He was highly successful in industrializing Mexico, but the
economic and social system created was largely imposed from above and
was, Professor Dunn believes, ill adapted to the native peasantry, who
constitute 90% of the population. During the interval between the Diaz
tyranny and the new nationalism the stage was filled, of course, by the
opira bouffe of revolutions, Wilsonian idealism, Madero, Huerta, the
American occupation of Vera Cruz, border raids, Carranza, and Villa.
With his decrees of 1915 and new constitution of 1917, Carranza set in
motion the new forces of reform. Article 27 of the Constitution altered
the fundamental law, which had given the owner of the surface fee title
full dominion over petroleum deposits, and sought to assimilate petroleum and other minerals to gold and silver, which in colonial New Spain
had belonged to the Crown. Controversy was inevitable, but in 1921
the Mexican Supreme Court offered a compromise. It held that Article
27 was not intended to apply retroactively to oil lands previously acquired for their deposits or upon which the owner had performed any
positive acts in assertion of his interest in the subsoil deposits: a plain
piece of judicial legislation. Here the matter rested, after the Bucareli
Conference of 1923, until 1925 when the Calles Government by Act of
Congress undertook to nationalize all petroleum deposits regardless of
the "acquired rights" doctrine, and to substitute for the fee held by foreign corporations a fifty-year concession. Again, in 1927, the Mexican
Supreme Court broke the deadlock, by holding the objectionable features
of the 1925 Act unconstitutional. Professor Dunn regards this settlement as a "compromise between conflicting economic interests rather
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than a solution derived by purely logical processes from abstract con7
cepts" (p. 366), a thesis which he has developed at length elsewhere.
In 1910 the Mexican pe6n was in a sorry plight, resulting mainly
from the efforts to impose an advanced system of private ownership of
property upon a native population accustomed for centuries to a feudal
system of land tenure. These efforts began with Juarez and were continued by Diaz. In the colonial era great landholders had existed side
by side with the native villagers who held their land in common. The
Constitution of 1857, however, forbade the holding of land by civil or
ecclesiastical corporations, and in consequence much of the village communal land, instead of passing to small landholders, went to enlarge the
great estates. Carranza's decree of 1915 set out to annul all transfers
of communal lands. The Constitution of 1917 with its Art. 27 followed,
the general design of which was to remove land and all natural resources
from the domain of absolute private property and to allow the state to
dictate the condition and extent of their use by individuals. Mexico's
object was to preserve her resources for her own people, to rehabilitate
the "forgotten man," and to limit the control of the foreigner. The
American State Department, however, insisted on adequate compensation for its citizens. *A compromise was reached by the Bucareli Conference in the agreement of the United States to accept federal bonds as
indemnity for the "just" value of the land, the General Claims Commission to adjudicate any differences. No such claims have yet come
before it.
With the growth of the nationalist spirit in Mexico came renewed
pressure on foreigners to prevent their resort to the diplomatic interposition of their own governments. Mexico sought to make the ownership of land itself a bar to such resort, and also to restrict severely the
ownership by corporations of rural property. In the correspondence
following Mr. Kellogg's famous Aide Memoire of November 17, 1925,
protesting against these laws, the State Department contended that the
laws of those states of the Union which limited the disposition of property owned by aliens did not in any instance apply to rights already
vested in aliens, but this assertion about its own laws, as Professor Dunn
points out (pp. 387-389), was unhappily far from accurate. Perhaps
the thing that aroused most American resentment, the author suggests,
was the "Calvo clause" in the Alien Land Law, which required aliens
having interests in Mexico to renounce their government's protection.
This was, of course, an old device in the history of Mexican legislation
on foreign contracts. The Mexican Government plausibly maintained
7

See his PRoMMr.oN

(1933) 21 GEo. L. J. 521.

OF NATONALS

(1932), reviewed by the present writer in
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that a state could not be barred from protecting its nationals, but that
an alien might renounce his right without affecting the international
right of his state. But, as forfeiture of the alien's property was the
penalty of violation of the clause, an alien would never seek his own
government's protection unless he stood to lose all, anyway; so that the
individual's waiver would pretty effectively defeat his government's
right of protection. The answer, of course, is that such a waiver by an
individual would be against the public policy of his government and
therefore void.
A chapter analyzes the cases decided by the General and Special
Claims Commissions of 1923. The General Commission first met on
August 30,1924, with a life of three years. Its term was twice extended,
so that it sat theoretically seven years. In this time it disposed of only
148 claims out of a total of 3,617 filed by both governments. Of the
four last years of its term, about two years were spent in squabbling
over the choice of the neutral Presiding Commissioner! Two things
about this Commission are of special interest: exhaustion of the claimant's local remedies was not made a prerequisite to jurisdiction, and of
the 148 cases adjudicated 129 represented unanimous decisions. It is
also of interest that dissenting opinions were allowed to be filed.8 Professor Dunn's analysis of these decisions is interesting. The Special
Commission, organized to deal exclusively with revolutionary claims,
decided only 18 cases in seven years, 17 of these being the "Santa
Ysabel" claims, arising on the cold-blooded murder by Villa of 15 American employees of a mining company in 1916. They were rejected by a
majority of the Commission (Nielson, American Commissioner, dissenting) on the ground that Villa, who received an amnesty from the Mexican Government in 1920, was a bandit and not a revolutionist!
A final chapter draws certain conclusions, not flattering. Professor
Dunn thinks that diplomatic protection has a useful function, especially
as a preventive. "But," he adds (pp. 426-7), "with all due allowance
for these factors, it still must be admitted that, taken as a whole, the
record of the operation of diplomatic protection in the relations between
the United States and Mexico has been surprisingly bad. As an institution for the peaceful solution of conflicts of interest, its accomplishments
have been meager. Instead of removing or neutralizing occasions for
controversy, it often seems to have generated them. One is constantly
impressed with the fact that, whenever there is a definite clash of mate'The American Commissioner, Mr. Fred K. Nielson, has collected his majority

and dissenting opinions in a single volume, with a commentary, NImsoN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLiED TO RECLAmATioNs (1934), reviewed by the present
writer in (1934) 22 GEo. L. J. 880. The Commission's opinions also appear under

the Government imprint (1927-1931).
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rial interests, each side is quite able to derive from established legal
rules and principles an answer that accords neatly with its own material
interests. . . . In the light of the foregoing observations, our first conclusion must be that the law of diplomatic protection as a logical method
for arriving at answers to disputes without regard to the immediate interests or relative strength of the contending parties, is consistently
ineffective."
This volume is one of a series, now in progress, of Columbia 'University Studies in our legal-economic relations with Mexico. Professor
Dunn has done his task in a thoroughly workmanlike manner. If his
book is now and then, tedious, and has a slightly metallic tone, it is because he has followed his documentary sources closely and without injecting too frequently his personal views. His analysis of legal arguments and cases is careful and convincing. Only one or two misprints
were noted, and one curious slip where the author says "President Wilson was defeated at the polls by Harding" (p. 346).
If any excuse were needed for so extended a notice as this, it must
be found in the vital importance, political, economic and social, which
our Southern neighbor has for us now. A clear understanding of past
controversies can do much to remove the causes of future ones, and
Professor Dunn's book goes far to aid such a clear understanding.
MANGUM WEEKS.
Washington, D. C.
A Study of the Business of the Federal Courts. Part I, Criminal Cases.
Part IL Civil Cases. The American Law Institute, Philadelphia,
1934. Pp. 153, xxxix; 217, xxvii.
The present volumes are the fruition of a project originated by the
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement which had
for its aim the study of the administration of law in the federal courts
through a scientific analysis of both civil and criminal case records, with
the general purpose of testing the efficiency of the administration of
justice in these courts. Following the demise of the Commission in
1931, the work was carried on by the American Law Institute with
financial aid from the Rockefeller Foundation. Twelve different law
schools' co6perated in collecting case material in thirteen 2 federal jurisdictions in widely separated parts of the country. As originally planned,
the field studies for the collection of data were to cover two years and
were to be supplemented by several control studies to operate as checks
I Including that of the University of North Carolina. Under the supervision of

Dean C. T. McCormick, the field-work was done by Messrs. Henry Bane, of the
Durham
Bar, and Neil Sowers, of the Statesville Bar.
2
Including the Western District of North Carolina, presided over by Hon. E.
Yates Webb, U. S. District Judge.
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on the accuracy of the data already compiled. Due to the exigencies
of time and expense, however, the scope of the project had to be somewhat restricted, with the result that the collection of data was limited
to a single year and the other studies were omitted. Nevertheless, because of their thoroughness and extent, the reports present a comprehensive exhibit of statistical methods as a means of court study. They
are doubtless the most detailed statistical studies in the operation of
courts ever attempted in this country. The careful analysis of 35,671
criminal cases besides an additional number of 37,065 cases dealing with
prohibition enforcement, and of 9,852 civil cases, is a mine of greatly
needed information for which the lawyer, criminologist, political scientist and specialist in law administration will be duly grateful. The volumes should be read in conjunction with, and in the light of, the
illuminating statistical picture of the activities of the Supreme Court
3
of the United States presented by Frankfurter and Landis.
PART I. CRIMINAL CASES

Judicial criminal statistics fall generally into four categories: (1)
personal statistics relating to the social background of the individual
defendant; (2) procedural data concerning the various methods and
devices by which criminal cases are disposed of in the courts; (3)
statistics with respect to punishment meted out to convicted defendants;
and (4) statistics concerning the business management of courts. The
present study is concerned primarily with data falling within the second
and third of these divisions. Interspersed throughout with innumerable
statistical charts and tables are chapters showing the types of cases coming before the courts, the quasi-criminal business on the civil dockets,
the disposition of criminal cases (including the discharge of the defendant without trial, discharge of the defendant after trial, number of
convictions, manner of conviction, convictions on pleas of guilty, and
the guilty plea technique), the use of indictments and informations,
pleas, pleadings, trials (including the number of cases brought to trial,
disposition of liquor cases and non-liquor cases, comparative data on
results of federal and state court trials, waiver of jury trial, extent to
which juries are used, number of convictions by court and jury, and
the comparative promptness with which cases are brought to trial and
I See Frankfurter and Landis, The Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act

of 1925 (1928) 42 HARv. L. REv. 1, reviewing the 1923 to 1927 terms inclusive;
The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1928 (1929) 43 H. v. L.
REv. 33; The Business of tire Supreme Court at October Term, 1929 (1930) 44
HA.v, L. REv. 1; The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1930
(1931) 45 HARV. L. REv. 271; The Businzess of the Supreme Court at October Term,
1931 (1932) 46 HARv. L. Ray. 226; The Business of the Suprene Court at October

Term, 1932 (1933) 47 HARV. L. Rav. 245; The Busiess of the Supreme Court at
October Term, 1933 (1934) 48 HA.v. L. Rav. 238.
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disposed of without trial) and sentences. Detached from the text are
thirty-three detailed statistical tables valuable for reference purposes.
Limitations of space preclude extended analysis of the survey's findings,
but brief reference to some of its outstanding conclusions should indicate its value and significance.
In much of our contemporary literature and discussion adversely
criticizing the "technical" nature of criminal procedure and stressing the
need for "simplification," the procedural rules are held out as the sole
or principal reason for the ineffectiveness of criminal law enforcement.
Little heed is given to the baffling complexity of the problem of crime
or the extent to which its causes are rooted in the social and economic
organism. The widely publicized results of what has been euphemistically called "the sporting theory of justice" are the stock in trade of
every college debater and political commentator and are usually assumed
without argument: delays and continuances, irrational juries, a cumbersome grand jury, long trials, appeals on obsolete doctrinal points, ineffective judicial control of the trial, and the like. The present stuay
fails to reveal the presence of these obstacles. Proceedings in the federal courts are expeditious, non-technical and largely uncontested. A
technique of handling cases by plea of guilty came into extensive use
some twenty years ago and is responsible for the prompt and efficient
disposition of business. This method has been condemned as "bargaining" but it is doubtful if the system could operate without it. There
is no single method of procedure which insures efficient results in such
a way that they can be measured statistically. jury trials may be the
speediest method of handling cases in districts where the methods of
jury trial are well understood. Grand juries are not necessarily a source
of delay. The notion that most of our troubles in the administration of
criminal justice lie in the so-called "sporting theory" of justice with its
attendant emphasis on technicalities may well have been true in 1914
and 1915 when only 50% of all convictions were had on a guilty plea
in the federal courts, and when these convictions on guilty pleas represented only 35% of all cases terminated. The change, however, since
1915 is startling as shown by this report. In 1930 the number of convictions on guilty pleas had risen to approximately 907o of all convictions. And of all cases terminated in any way (including dismissals
and discontinuances) 74% were terminated on guilty pleas. This prevalence of the guilty plea technique appears to be uniform in nearly all
the districts. As the report points out, "it becomes obvious that the
notion of the criminal law, as something to be enforced, has in practice
been superseded by the practical necessity of dealing with the individual
offender in as informal a way as is consistent with public safety." 4
4P.

13.
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The report does not overemphasize the importance of statistics in
criminal law administration. Data showing that there are more murders
in proportion to the population in Chicago than in London may be very
interesting, but they throw no light upon the reasons for the difference
or what measures should be taken by the former city to reduce its murder rate. The report suggests the need for combining studies by trained
observers with statistical investigations. "Throughout the entire report,"
its authors note, "situations repeatedly occur where variations and discrepancies are disclosed, 'but the figures furnish no data upon which they
can be explained; in such cases supplementary material is needed to
complete the picture." 5
Nevertheless, effective public control over the criminal courts must,.
in the final analysis, rest on judicial statistics. The great value of statistics is to indicate the nature and magnitude of the problems that beset
us and the most important topics for further and more intensive investigations. The inadequacy of available criminal statistical data in the
United States, both in the states and in the federal government, has
always made generalizations based upon such data exceedingly dangerous. At least so far as the federal courts are concerned, our criminal
law reformers may now carry forward their work on a more solid basis
of fact.
PENDLETON HowARD.

College of Law, Univesity of Idaho,
Moscow, Idaho.
PART II. CIwL CASES
The civil cases studied included only those terminated in the thirteen districts during the year from July 1, 1929 to June 30, 1930. They
number 9,852. By districts, the largest numbers came from New York,
Illinois and Michigan, 2,075, 1,542 and 1,521, respectively. The smallest number came from Connecticut and North Carolina, namely, 141
from each district.
Information was collected from the clerks' appearance dockets,
clerks' files, judgment dockets, judgment files and card indexes, showing
identification, type and origin of each case; basis of and objections to
jurisdiction; residences of parties; when, how, at what stage, and in
whose favor case terminated; duration of litigation, relief awarded; and
parties to and methods, grounds, and results of appeals. In addition,
for the three-judge cases, special data were obtained. The appendix
sets forth the manual of instructions for field workers and sample record
forms.
The resulting two hundred-odd pages of detailed charts, tables and
P.15.

126

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

findings present not a thesis but a transcript. Based upon extensions of
methods first worked out by various law schools in similar studies of
state courts in Connecticut, Maryland, Ohio and West Virginia, the
report is still frankly experimental. "In so far as this study discloses
a lack of significance in any of the purely quantitative results obtainedt
it may be looked upon as a contribution to our knowledge of the practical limitations upon statistical analysis in the field of legal administration."0 While hoping that the mass statistics may provide reliable
facts regarding court activities, which, so far as they go, may be used
to verify, support, disprove or suggest general hypotheses, the authors
recognize that "facts in themselves do not proye what should be the
policy of law administration or the direction of reform therein. Their
function is but to cast light upon the factors which should shape the
rules of policy."'7 Substantially, the only recommendations relate to
jury waiver, summary judgments, discovery before trial, and improved
methods of reporting judicial statistics to the Department of Justice.
A few of the findings of general interest follow: During the year
covered, about three-fifths of the civil litigation in the lower federal
courts consisted of government cases in which the United States was a
party; about one-fifth were private cases dealing with federal questions;
and another one-fifth were private cases based on diversity of citizenship. Although the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment has since eliminated a large part of the government cases, the report surmises that
government cases arising under the New Deal legislation may more than
take their place. Certainly, "the number of federal questions has been
constantly increasing as a result of the large number of matters being
brought under the control of the federal government." As to diversity of citizenship cases, "it is interesting to note that a large number
-well over half and approaching three-quarters-involve foreign corporations doing business within the state, and also that a very large
proportion of all cases are simple tort, contract and negligence cases,
cases of the type normally heard in the state courts." D Of the 9,852
cases terminated in the thirteen districts in that one year, only 325, or
3.3%, were by verdict of a jury; 2,674, or 27.2%, were terminated by
decision of a court;' a negligible number by decision of a referee; 2,760,
or 28%, by default, consent, stipulation or compromise; and 4,057, or
41.2%, by dismissal, discontinuance, withdrawal, nonsuit or remand to
state court. The detailed variations and explanations of these and
many other groups of figures make a significant commentary upon the
work of the federal courts.
OP. 27.

1p. 18.

7P. 17.

OP. 18.
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That this study will influence the Supreme Court's pending revision10
of the rules of practice for the lower federal courts is assured by the
fact that several of the men who took part in the preparation of the
study are now assisting the Court as members of the advisory committee appointed last June to recommend a tentative draft of the proposed
regulations. These include Dean Charles E. Clark, Yale Law School,
and Professors Edmund M. Morgan, Harvard Law School, and Edson
R. Sunderland, University of Michigan Law School.
The values of this Study of the Business of the Federal Courts lead
one to hope that the American Law Institute will extend its functions
beyond the writing of Restatements of the rules of the various branches
of the substantive law, so as to embrace further investigations of the
characteristics and consequences of the law in action.

M. T. VAN HECIE.
Chapel Hill, N. C.
" See Edson R. Sunderland, The Character and Extent of the Ride-making
Power Granted to the U. S. Supreme Court and Methwds of Effective Exercise,
21 A. B. A. jouR. 404 (1935).

